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Tli E EFFECT OF OFFER-OF-SETTLEIVIENT RULES
ON Tl-'IE TERl\AS OF SETTLEMENT
LUU-\N ARVE IJEBCHUK and HOW<\ RD F. CHANG '''

Unde r an · ·urtc: r-ul- sCltie me Jlt. · ru le, a party tu ~! l~twsuit may make: a speci al
offer to settle with t!Jc othe r party . su ch tha t if th e other p~ trty rejects thi s offer.
the n thi s offe r bec omes part of th e reco rd in th e case a nd may affect the al locati on
o f litigati o n cosls. S peci fica ll y. if the parties litigate to judgme nt, the n the al location
of liti gation costs may depend on how the judg ment co mp ares with the spec ial offer. This paper develops a mode l of barg aining under offer- of-settle ment rul es that
can be used to ana lyze the effec t that such rul es have on th e terms o f settlement.
The a nal ys is first sets forth a ge ne ral princ ipl e that ident ifi es the settle ment amo u nt
under any such rule . We then apply thi s princ ipl e to derive the settleme nt terms
under th e most important of these rul es, and we ide ntify a large se t of see mingly
diffe rent rul es that p rod uce iclcn ti ca l settle me nts .

l.

INTRODUCTION

TI-Irs

paper an alyzes the effec ts of ''offer-of- settleme nt '' rules on the
terms of settleme nt. The an alysis shows that such rul es can sys tem aticall y
shift the te rm s of set tl e ment, a nd we de ri ve surpri singly sharp results regarding th e direction and magnitude of these shifts. The analysis also sho ws
how we ca n des ign suc h rules to ne utral ize th e advantage that parti es w it h
lower litigation costs wo uld otherwi se e nj oy .
'' Lucian Arye Bebch uk is the William J. Friedman and Ali cia Townse nd Friedma n Profe ssor of Law. Econom ic s. and Fin ance at Harvard Law SchooL Howard F. Chang is Profe ssor of La w at the Univers ity of Southe rn Ca li forn ia Law Schoo L This paper is a significant ly
revised ve rsion of Pur Ju ly 1992 manu script ' ·An Economic Analysis of Offer-of-Sett lement
Rules .· · For helpful L"<1ll111lents . we wish to thank I::Jn Ayres . Jacob Glazer. Louis Kaplow.
Avery Kat z. Steven Shavell . Kathryn Spier-, and se minar partici pants at the Uni ve rsity of
Californ ia, Be rkele y. the Un ive rsity of Chicago. George Wash ington Univers ity, Tel- Aviv
Univers ity, Yale Uni versit y. the 1995 Ha:-v::u·cl La w Schoo l conference on the economics of
liti gat ion , an d the Jl)l)7 meet ings of the American Law and Economic s Assoc iation and of
the~ Nation a l Bureau of E-::ono t~i c Resea rch Summer Institu te. Lucian Bebchuk ·s wo rk has
been sup porte d by the: Nat iona l Science Foundation and the Harvard Law School .l ohn i'v!.
Ol in Center fo r Law. Econom ic s. ~ 111cl Bu siness . 1-lowarcl Chang's wo rk has been supported
by the James 1-l. Zu 111 bcrge Faculty R e :;e~m·h and I nnov:~tion Fu nd <lt the Uni vers ity of South ern Ca liforn ia.
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Under an offer- of-sett lement rul e, a party to a la ws uit may make a special offer to settl e with the other party, such that if the other party rejects
this offer, then thi s offer (unlike an ordin ary offer) beco mes part of the record in the case and may affect the all oc ati on of liti gati on costs. Specifi cally ,
if the parties liti gate to judgment. th en the all ocati on of liti gat io n costs ma y
depe nd on ho w the judgment compa res with the special o ffe r. Th e co urt
may shift costs to the p~tny t h~tt fail s to im prove on the s pc ci~tl offer at trial. 1
Offer-of-set tk mcm r t:k:~ \..-: tn v~t r y \\ itil rc:-; pcct to SC \ "Cr ~t l fc~ttu rcs : Jf onl y
one party may make a s p .:::ci~tl utl<:t·, \\ hich pa rty ma y do so·) Fur each party
that ma y make a s peci~tl \ll'fc r. is such an offer mandatory or optional? If
both the plaintiff ~1 n cl the clcfe ncbnt m<ty make special offers, does the ruk
reg ulate the sequence in whi ch they make these offers" Tf so , what order
does the rule specify? For each special offer, if the offe ree rej ects the offer,
then what are the impli cat ions for the allocation of litigation costs? For example, under one-sided cost shifting, such an offer can tri gge r cost shifting
only in favor of the party making the offer: if an offeree who rejected the
offer fail s to improve on that offer at tri al, then the co urt may require the
offeree to pay the costs incurred by the other party since making the special
offer. If the rule triggers two-sided cost shifting instead, then the party
making the rejected offer similarly may be required to pay the conesponding costs of the offeree if the judgme nt at trial is less fa vorable to the offeror than the special offer. Thus, there is a large family of possible offerof-settlement rules.
Numerous jurisdiction s in the United States have adopted such rul es in
order to encourage parti es to settle out of court. The most notable example
is Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Like many parallel state
rules , Rul e 68 provides th at a defendant may make a special offer of judgment. If the plaintiff accepts the offer, th en the co urt enters judgment as
specified in the offer. Otherwise , the offer can trigger one-sided cost shifting: if the plaintiff finall y obtains a juclgrnent that is not more fav o rable
than the offer, then the plaintiff must pay the costs incurred by the defendant after makin g the offe r. Rul e 68 has been the subj ect of substanti al debate and has provoked proposal s for reform .'
Other countri es also use offer- of-se ttl ement schemes . Fo r example, in
1 Similar rul es may shift k gal cos ts aga inst parti es th at rejec t a pro posed mediati on awa rd
(ra ther than a sett leme nt propost·d by one ot· the parti es) an d then fail to improve on that
proposal ::Jt trial. Hen ry S. F~u·bc 1· & Mi chelle J. Whit e, Medi ca l i'vlalpracti ce : An Empirical
Ex aminati on of th e Liti gation l)rocc ss. 22 RAND J. Econ . 199 ( 1991 ), provides an empirical
ana lys is of medical malpractice litigation in a state th ::Jt requires such mediat io n.
~ See , fo r examp le. Prelimi nurv Draft o f Propo sed Am endm ents to th e Federal Rules of
Civil Proced ure. 98 F.R .D. 33 9 . .oG I-6 3 ( 1983) : 102 F. R.D. 425,432-33 ( 1984).
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England a defendant may make a spec ial o ffer through " payment inro
court. " ' Under the Eng li sh rule of cost all ocat ion. a party th at loses at tri al
bears th e liti ga tion cos ts (including attorn eys' fees) of th e winning party.
Unde r the payment-into-court procedure, if the plai nt iff rejec ts th e defenda nt's spec ial offer, th e n the pl aintiff will rccuver cos ts and fe es from th e
cl cfe ncbnt mzlv if it win s mo re at tri al than tl 1l~ ~1mo u nt o f th e spec ial offe r.
If the 11bin ti ff wins at trial but fai ls t\l iilljlrl' \t~ on th e spec ial otTer, th en
the j)Llit11iil. mu st pay the costs inc mrL:d b;. tir e.: ,_k: f:.::mia nt .~i t lL·e tilL' elate nf
the spec ial ofi"e r. ·!
TilL: eco nomi c anal ys is of R ule 68 ~tn d u l· :-;inlil,tr uffc r-o f-sct tl e ment rules
bets fucuse d on the effect of such ruks 011 tile li ke lihood or settlcment. 5
Sc holars have examined the claim that tul es li ke Rul e 68 increase the likeli hood of settl e rn ent. 6 Tn con tras t to this li terature. our foc us is on th e effec ts
o f such rul es on the terms of settl e ment.
Understandin g the effect s of procedural rul es and institutional arran gements on the terms of settle ment is ve ry important. 7 The vas t majority of
3 Sec: Jan ice Toran, Settl ement, Sanctions. and Anorn ey Fees: Co mparin g Eng li sh Payme nt into Court and Proposed Rul e 68. 35 Am. U. L. Rev. 30 I ( 1986).
" If the defendant wi ns at tri al in stead. then it will recover costs from the pl aintiff according to the usual Engli sh rule of cost all ocat ion.
5
For the appli cation of economi c theory to thi s iss ue, see Davi d A. Ande rson , Improving
Settlemen t De vices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. Lega l Stud . 225 ( 1994 ); Tai- Yeong Chu ng,
Sett lement of Liti gation under Rule 68: An Eco nomi c Ana lys is. 25 J. Legal Stud. 26 1 (1 996);
Am y Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Can Cost Shifti ng Redu ce the [nc idence of Tri aP Pretrial
Bargaining in the Face of a Rul e 68 Offer (u npub li shed ma nu script, Jul y 1996): Keith N.
Hy lton, Rule 68, the Mod ified Briti sh Rul e, and Civil Liti gation Reform , I Mich. L. & Pol'y
Rev . 73 ( 1996): Geoffrey P. Miller, An Eco nomi c ;.\ nal ysis of Rul e 68, 15 J. Lega l Stud. 93
( 1986): Kat hryn Sp ier. Pretri al Bargaini ng and the Des ign of Fee-S hiftin g Rul es, 25 RAND
J. Econ. 197 ( 1994). For empiri ca l work on th is ques ti on. see Dav id A. Anderso n & Th omas
D. Row e, Jr .. Empirical Ev idence on Settle ment Dev ices: Dues Rule 68 Encou rage Settlemenr·J 71 Chi.- Kent L. Rev. 51 9 ( 1995); Thomas D. Rowe. Jr .. & Dav id A. Anderson. OneWay Fee Shifting Statutes and Offer of Jud gment Rules: An Expe ri me nt, 36 Ju rime trics J.
255 ( 1996): Thomas D. Row e, Jr. . & Ne il Vi dm ar. Empit·ical Resea rch on Offers of Sett leme nt: A Pre lim inary Report, 51 L:tw & Contern p. Probs. 13 ( 1988).
'' The import~lllt paper by Spi er, .w pm note 5. fu r example, examines pretri al barga in ing
unde r asym mc:t ric informa ti on to see if cost- shifti ng ruks based on the se ttl eme nt offers
made by the parties lead to more settlement. In a tnec:han isrn-des ign frame work, she concludes that cost shi fting based on offers of se tt ktnellt wou ld yield a highe r settl e ment rate
tha n an y other cost-shifting rul e a court co uld :tdupt. The th reat of cost shifti ng deters the
parties from mJking extreme sett lement offers ami enco urages the m to neg oti ate in good
fJith. T hus, unde r offer- of-sett le me nt rules, specia l o il ers arc more cred ible signals of the
offeror's be lie fs. By facili tating the exchange of credi ble informatio n, these rules can in crease
the like lihood uf settle ment.
7
l-or a general d iscussion of the im portance of ga ini ng such an un derstand ing. see
Luci an A. Bebchuk, On the Differe nce be tween Se tt lem ent Terms and the Ex pected Judgmen t (unpubl ished ma nusc ript, 1997) .
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cases end in settlement rather than in judgment. T he rn ~1i n impzlct of the law
on outcomes (and in turn on ex ante behavior) is therefore not directly
thro ug h judgments rendered by courts but rather \nclirr:ct ly by shaping the
terms of settlements. Thus, identifying th e effects of the kgai system on
vc anzdysis of the
settlement terms is important for any positive or
outcom es produced by the system.
This paper pru \ ides a fn.ln1e\vork for ·
'
ui·i,.._lt:r

such rul es .>~ Indeed : the paper derives ~l general :_ ·.: : su lL Lh;_tt Ci1ablcs us to
iJc11tify the exp~ct cd ~cttl:.;n1ent LenliS und\~ r any gi\·\:: ri utTci.-- 0t'<:;cLLlLrnent
rule. \Ve then :.tpply this result to derive the \.!Ulcu:\K:; under the most important of these rules.
An essential element of the framework we will cievciop is the effect of a
special offer on any subsequent bargaining between the parties. If an offeree rejects a special offer, this rejection does not imply that the parties
will not settle. The parties may still subsequently make ordinary settlement
offers, as they could in the absence of a special offer, and thereby reach a
settlement. The parties will conduct these settlement negotiations, however,
in the shadow of a different threat point than they would in the absence of
a special offer. The presence of a special offer will affec t the expected payoffs for the parties if the case goes all the way to judgment at trial. Therefore , the outcome of the bargaining game that the parties would play if an
offeree rejects a special offer is a function of the settlement amount proposed in the special offer. Thus, an offeror \vmtld make a ::;pecial offer in
light of its anticipated effect on su bsequent bargaining.
The identification of the settlement amount expected under any given
offer-of-settlement rule will enab le us to examine (i) which party benefits
from each rule. and (ii) how the settlement amount compares with the expected judgment (that is, the mean amount thal the panics ex pect the plaintiff to win at trial). The analysis shows. surprisi ng ly. that a large set of
seemingly different rules produce identical settlements.
Our mode l has important implications for bo th positive and normative
analysis. The model enables us to derive not only the :-;etth~ment outcomes
that emerge under existing offer-of-settlement rules but cdso those that
\vould occur under proposed offer-of-sc tt } ern<~nL rul:; s (should they be
adopted). T his iUlcl1_ysis is essential for any positive account of the outcomes
:-; In contra:~t to ut hcr p~tpers th~tt consider these scltlc! t1LlH tc rLh. sul_·h as !\,Iiller. SUJJU!
5. and .-\ nckrso n. su;Jro nute S. \Ve explicitly !1H>ck 1 til e procc:;s of b~trgaining bet\\·ec n
[he parties.

n~._-n e

1
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prod uced by legal rul e ~ as wel l as for any normat ive evaluation cf perfo rmance of these rules in producing des ired outc omes .
On e normative impli cati on that we explore is the fo llo-.,v in g. P arti t~s o ften
differ considerably in their litigat ion costs.Y In the abse nce o f an o llcr-of':cttle ment rule. se ttleme nt amounts can be expec ted to cie vi~lte fro m th e cx pcctc cl j ud gmt:?nt in favo r of the party with lo wer iitig ot iun cos ts. If th<: c:-;~),~ l_ :tt~d jL ;dg rn ~~nt in ~1 case is tht: best ~l v adabl e pro sy fur the uU[!_· o;·n,_~ :.h ~ll
, ,,. )·,
. '~ ~

. •- , I

li ·..:-\·i ~lLi~__iiL'I fl"u ;n t il~: ~x pectcd jLidgnlC~JH ~~rc ut~L: ~:-}i r ~ib k.: . () ur ;..uiLd) ~;;.; .~Lt~\\ · s

huw . un der sume commo n l·irc umsl~lllt.: es. we Cd il dc ~i gn oiT:: r-of->,,.:r.tk !l: c·iH
rules Lu clin1inale the bargainii·ig ;__td vanlagc th at Lhc party \ViLh lc:\vcr Lti g ~~
tion costs would oth erw ise enjoy. Furthermore . to design th ese rul e~; tu ac comp li sh this goaL pub lic offi cial s wo uld not need to kno1.v in advance
which party has the lowe r liti gati on costs. While we nn e! th e possibie use
of offer- of-settlement rules to neutralize th e bargainin g advantage of parti es
with lower litigation costs quite interestin g, we vv ish to emph as ize tha L for
th e reas ons di sc ussed earlier, analysts vvho have no interest in thi s partic ular goal should still find releva nt our general anal ys is of ho w offer-ofsettlement rul es affect se ttlement terms.
The analysis in thi s paper is organized as foll ows . Sec tion II prese nts our
fra me wo rk of analys is. Sectio n III analy zes bargai ni ng both with and without offer-of-settl ement rul es and puts forward the basic lemma that subsequent section s will use to identify the outcome under partic ul ar offerof-settl ement rul es. Section IV analyzes the case of o ne spec ial offer and
one-sided cost shifting, Section V analyzes the case of one spec ial offer and
two-sided cost shifting, and Secti on VI analyzes the case in which eac h side
makes a spec ial offer. Secti on VII ad dresses an important extension of the
mode l. Section VIII considers the implicatio ns o f the mode l for the outcomes under the existing Rule 68 and for th e des ign of offer-of- sett lement
rules . Final ly. Section IX conc ludes .

11.

fRA MEWORK O f' ANALYSIS

Supp ose that a risk-neutra l plaintiff fil es a suit ogain st a ri sk-neutrai defendan t at time r = 0. f-\ss um e that unless the parties settle out of co urt. the
cou rt will render judgme nt. If the parties proc eed cdl the way to judgment,
then in the interve ning time, the p!ai ntiff incms positive litigati on costs in

'' For <:x amp k _ in some ton cases the de fend ant migh t face lo wer cus h bec.1 usc pf gr-~ <l t c r
expe rtise ur access tu infor mat ion. whereas in other to rr C'ls c:-; th e dc!'cndant mig ht L.tcc higher
iitigation costs becaus<c a

tri~il

wuuld disrup t the ckfenclanr·, up•.::ra tio ns.
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the amount CP, and th e defendant, in the amount Cc1. The parti es may 1ncur
diffe rent li tigati o n costs . For exa mpl e, th ey may differ in term s of th e costiin css of the ev ide nce th ey mu st produce in court or in terms of how cli srupti\'C the y find liti gation to be . Le t C den ote the total litigati on costs : C =
C ~~ + C"'d ·
.•\ :;s ume that th ere ~:re 11 stages to the litigati o n process, fro m th e filin g
of" ~ ui l to jud gme nt at trial. a nd th at th e part ies' liti gat ion costs a re spread

c;,

puni u11 uf ib tut~tl litigdt iun cos ts. Let
und c:: deno te the lit i g~1t. i on ex pcni:1 :-;tagc i by th e plaintiff and by th e defenda nt, rcspecti\·e ly. Ass ume
tl; dt lhc cou rt c:n observe th ese liti gati on costs ~1n cl can thucforc ~:lilocat c
the se C\lSts betwee n th e parri es accordin g to an y appli ca ble cos t-s hiftin g
rulc. Ass ume that th e parti es hav e identical di scount rates and that all
mon ey va lu es are ex pressed in terms of the ir prese nt di sco unted value at
tim e t = 0.
Both parties share the same expectation regarding the outcome at trial.
Let us assu me at first that the defendant concedes liability and the parties
di spute on ly th e amount of damages th at the defendant should pay th e
pl ai ntiff. Let D represent the damages th at the court would award to the
plaintiff at trial. From the perspective of the parties, D will be a random
va ri able. Let D de note the expected value of D, where D > 0. Assume that
Dis distributed according to a continuous probability density functionj(D).
Ass ume al so that the probability that D exceeds its _!!lean equals the probability that it does not: that is, assume that pr(D ::; D) = pr (D > D) = 1/:. .
We w ill late r ex tend our analysis to include skewed di stribution s, for which
pr(D ::; D) * 1h, as we ll as di sputes over liability .
Let J re prese nt the total amount that a judgment at trial would require
th e defenda nt to pay to the pl aintiff. Unde r an offer-of- se ttlem e nt rul e, thi s
judgment may include a cost- shifting element in addition to damages: J
may inc lude a pos iti ve amount in order to reimburse the plaintiff for its
liti gat io n cos ts , or J may include a negative am o unt in ord er to reimburse
the de fcn cla nt fo r its liti ga tion costs. The amount J will be un ce rtain becau se
D is a rand o m variable a nd cos t shifting under an offer-of- se ttlem e nt rul e
will turn on the value of D. Eve n in the absence of any offer-of-settlement
rule. J w ill be a rand o m variable, because then J = D.
T he parties may ma ke ordinary offers to settle out of court without invo king an y offe r-of- settle me nt rules. As is c usto mary in th e bargaining th e-

di tLt l\.::--

1

''

'" \Vc c~lll c:-; tend our analysis to inc lude cases in whi ch the cou n ca n obsc t· \·c and shift
11nl y p~ trt <lf 1hc:sc liti ga tion costs. We anal yzed su ch an extension in an C<trli er dra ft of thi s
papcT \\hich is ava il ab le ft·om the authors upon requ est. 'vVc also conside r pa rtial cos t shift ing
in Sc·ct. iutl V III. in whi ch we conside r the effects of the exi st ing Rule 68.
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ory literature, assume that the parti es would make ordinary offers in a sequence of bargaining round s. In particular, assume that before each stage
of the litigation process. th ere wo uld be a bargaining round in which one
party would make an ordinary offer and the other party would either accept
or reject the offer, the iden tity of th e party making the offer would be cletcrrnin ed randoml y at the starr t )f the round, and each party wo ul d b·-: equally
likel y to be th e uffero r. li the offeree rejects the offer, thc11 thc f'< li ties
\\O uld k gi! l the JlC.\ t sL 1 ~ '-· '>I til•: li r i g ~1tion process. in '' hich rh_· p;t !l i L' S
wo uld incur ;uwther fra cti Clli , t" thc i1· litigat ion costs, and the lXtrtic .~ \\u uld
enter an other round o r ba rg ~1Jnin g .
Gi ve n that the parti es :m: ri' k nc utr;:c l, the clefenclant sccb to minimi zc
its ex pected costs (its litig ati on cos ts plus any payment to the plaintiff'). ancl
the pl aintiff seeks to m~1xnm ze its expected payoff (any payment from the
defendant minus its litigati on cos ts). Assume that the parties have no mechani sm (such as a repeat player mi ght develop by cultivating a reputation for
intransigence) that would e nable them to bind themselves to a particular
bargaining strategy. That is, neither party can commit credibly to a strategy
of intransigence, which would enable it to obtain a larger fraction of the
gain s from settlement. Thus, each party would accept an offer if and only if
it were unable to improve its expected payoff by rejecting the offer instead.
For simplicity, assume that an offeror under any applicable offer-ofsettlement rule makes a special offer at time t = 0 before the first stage of
the litigation process, before the parties incur any litigation costs, and before the first round of ordinary bargaining. We can extend the analysis to
include the case in which speci al offers can be made at later points in
time . 11 Given the opportunity to make a special offer, the offeror would
choose to make an offer if and only if it were unable to improve its expected payoff by doing otherwise .
The structure of the bargaining ga me described above, including 11. D,
f(D ), and c~1 and c~ for i = 1,
, n, as well as any applic able offer-ofsettlement rule , is common kn owl edge to the participants. Thi s assumption
ensures that settlement occurs with certainty and always occurs before the
parti es incur any litigation costs . The assumption of perfect information
allo ws us to fo cus on th e iss ue th at we are interested in studyin g: the effect
of variou s offer-of- se ttl ement rul es on settlement amounts.
1

'

11 In an earlie1· dra tt of this paper. wh ich is available from the au thors upo n re q u e ~ t . we
ex pl ored suc h an exten sion ~ u 1d fo und that as long as both parti es can make spe ci~il otler:;,
the opti on of making thc:m later rath er th an soo ner does not change th e outcllme.
12 A pl:.1i ntillwill clwose to ti le a sui t only if it expects a positive payo ft from cluing so.
We may ass ume tk1t the c~1scs co nside red in thi s model arc only hypotheticaL and 11c lltlulcl
onl y actual ly observe ,;uits in th ose ca.ses in whi ch the expected se ttl ement is pos iti1·c.
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It will prove useful to refer to a more specit-tc example through out our
analysis. For thi s purpose. suppose that CP = 60, Cct = 20, and D is uni forml y di stributed in th e interval (60. 140). so that D = 100. We will use
thi s numerical example to il lustr;tte c)ur resu lts bl'low.
Ill.
~n

BARGAJN fN(i W ITH \ND \V!T H(ILJ I S PECIAL OF FER S

this ~;cct i nn. \\'e t.~ X~~rr: i ne tht?

C!UL> ::1J(__,

c;f

h_~rcnt r~~gi1r1es . .Fir~~t. \\':~ :J!1Lllyz,~ h~tr·:~~-:l!1 lng

scttL:: n•cnt rules. Second. \\ e \Y ill

i n t,· cJdu.~c

b~1rg~-tining

unde r t\V O dif-

in the abse nc e o f offer-u fthe po:-:sibil it y of in voking

n ller-of-settk ment ru les .
A.

Bwgu in in(!, \l "iilzoui 0/}~' i

-u( Sc:ulenzent Rules

Consider bargaining in the abse nce of any offer-of-settleme nt rules . Let
B represent the expected outco me of such an ordinary bargaining game.
That is, let B denote the amount th at the defendant can expect to pay the

plaintiff in a settlement, which we can expi~~s s as a function of D. We can
deri ve the ex pec ted se ttlement amount B(D) as the so lution to thi s bargal!1tng game.
PROPOSITION 1. The parties will settle in the fi rst round of bargaining,
and the expected settlement amo un t wo ul d be
(l)

We prove thi s proposition by bac kward induction. As in the sequentia l bargaining game ana lyzed by Arie l Rubinstein, the party making
the offer in any given round wo uld make the offer that is the leas t favorable
to the other party among all the offers th at the other party would find acceptable.1 ' This offer g ives the other party the payoff that it wo uld receive
if it rejected the offer ancl went on to the nex t round of barg aining.
Fo r example, suppose that the parties reach round n. If the plaintiff
makes the offer in round n. the n the plaintiff wo uld demand an amount
D + cJ . and the defendant wo ul d agree to pay it. If instead the defendant
makes the offer in ro und 11. then the defendant wou ld offer to pay an
amount D an d the plai ntiff \Vo ulcl accept the offer. Because each outcome is eq uall y li ke ly ex ante, the ex pected v a~ c of the settlement, condi Iiona l on the parti es reach ing ro un d 11 . will be D + 1h(cJ -- c;;) .
Suppose the parties reac h round n - - I. T he settlement offers they wo ul d
make would anticipate the expec ted va lue of a settlement in ro un d 11 if the
offer in rou nd 11 - I we re rejected. Thu s, if the plaint iff makes the offer,
Proof

c;,

1

'

Sec A ri el Rubin ste in. Pcrkct Equi libri um i n a D~! rgaining i'vlodc: l. :'i O Econometri ca 97
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1
• and the defendant
it would demand an am ount D + 1h(c:J - c~) +
woul d agree to pay it. If the defendant make s the offer. it vvoulcl offer to
pay 75 + 1h(C:! - c:;) - c;;- and th e plaintiff would accept the offer.
Because each outcome is equally likely ex ante. th e e xpe cted value of_the
settlement. conditional on th e parties reaching round 11 - l. will be D +
1

•

1

I< : :- \;_, \[<.}~. .

-

c;~

- c;:--

I'-Jnrt_-:: tl1 (tt

1

).

Co ntinuing this reas on ing to round l. v;e arrive

r[;,~-

t: i~l l ~n e t ui litigation cost:') plus J sildtc uf me surplus otJtam eJ through
~tgreemcnl.

They divid e lhis surp!us---tlut is. the total litigati on costs
~~ \ uiJed
settlement C =
+ C;,-equally. Thi~; llUtcome ;:; the same
as under the Nas h bargaining solution.
The settlement outcome will be more Ll v o r~lblc to the plaintiff than one
\NO uld expect the judgment itself to be if and only if Cct > CP. Conversely,
the settlement would be less favorable to the plaintiff if and only if the opposite inequal ity holds. Compared with the expected judgment D, the expected settlement amount B( D) will favor the party with lower litigation
costs.
EXAMPLE.
To illustrate this effect, consider our numerical example, in
which Cct < CP. In that case, the expected settlement would be !}(D) = 80,
which is less than 100, the expected ju dgment. T hus, B(D) < D, and compared to the expected judgment, the expected settlement would favor the
defendant.

c,

1

'

B.

Bargoining ·with Off'er-of'-Scttlement Rules

Let us nov; turn to bargaining under an offer-of-settlement rule. W c will
start by setting forth a general result that will enable us to predict the outcome under any given offer-of-settlement rule. T he subsequent analysis will

Furthermore. if the litic:ation costs in the flrst stac:e, d and c',. are a small proportion of
the total litigation costs, the7l little will turn on which party gets t(; make the offer in the lirst
round. and the actual settl emt:ilt will be correspondingly close to the expected settlement
amount B(D ).
'' The Na sh bargainin g solution is a couperc;tive game solution. Ro bert Cooter introduced
it to the iitig~;tion conrc:\l and has us ed it extensi·vcl y in this co ntex t. See. ['(x example. Robert
Cooter. Toward a Market in Unmatured Ton CLtims. 75 Va. L. Rev. 383 ( 1989): Robert
Cooter & Th omas Ulen. Law and Economics ( l9SS). Our mock\ fo llow s the noncooperative
approach to bargaining. which. unlike the cDopera tive approach. seeks tu model explicitly
the bargJining prucc:ss. As envisioned by Nash. Ih,: outcumc of noncooperative models is
urtcn equi\·alent to that predicted by the "black-b u \~ .. mudt: ls uf the coop<:rative approach.
For ~:n analy sis uf the relationship between
and no::cooperativc model s. see Ken
Binmore. Ariel Rubin sk in. & i'\sher \Volinsky.
i'<:::;h Bargaining Sulutiun in Ecl111 0I1lic
Motkliing. 17 RA :'-iD J. Econ. 176 (i9:)6l.
1

'
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use this bas ic lemma to derive the settlement outc ome under seve ral specifi c
offer- of-settlement rul es.
Suppo se that one party may make one spec ial offe r at time r = 0, immediately before the first round of ordinary bargaining ancl be fore the first
stage uf li tigati on. First, let us ass ume that onl y one party m ~1 y make such
an otTer and th at thi s party wil l in deed make thi s offe r. Le t 5 den ote th e
~ll1Hlll !lt proposed in thi s specia l otlc r. L tter, in Sc:c ti on V l. we w ill exiend
\llir ;I!L tly :-:i_-; ll' twO -]Xtrt y rule :< lllh kl· \\·hi,..:ll hotli p; tril c :: L·;:11 m:.tkc ~:pcc~;:l
ul ·t-~t·s .

The ~c y po int tu recogni ze ic: th~ tl if the spcc:i a! oller we re rejected . thi s
r<..:jcdiull wo uld 110t necessaril y mean that the ...:asc \\·o ulcl no t be :;c ttk cl:
the: pa rtie s might still make ordinary settlement oilers an d thereby reach a
sett lement. The parties will cond uct th ese se ttlement negot iati ons, however,
in the shadow of a di fferent expected judgment tha n they wo uld in the absence of a special offer. Under an offer-of- settlement rule, the speci al offer
will affect the payoffs that the parties can ex pect if the case ends in a judgment at tri al. Specifically, if the special offer 5 is rej ected , then the judgment 1 may include a cost-shifting element, depending on how D compares
with S. Thu s, the judgme nt wi ll be a fun ction of 5: let 1(5) represent the
judgment from trial , including the cost shifting du e under the relevant offerof-settlement rule give n the special offer 5. Let B again denote the payoff
to plaintiff from the ordinary bargaining game , in thi s case, the ordi nary
bargainin g game that the parties wou ld play if an offeree rej ec ted a special
offer. The outcome B is still a function of the expected j udgment but £[11
is no longer simply D. the expected damages, because 1 is now a function
of 5.
Consider the effect of an increase in 5 on the judgment 1(5). In those
cases in which 5 changes from an amount less th an D to an amo unt greater
th an or eq ual to D, li ab ility for C 1 will shift to the plaintiff, or liability for
Cr will shift back to the plaintiff, or both , depending o n wh ich costs shift
un der the offe r-of-sett lement rule. In all other cases. the increase in 5 will
not affe ct 1(5). Therefore , the ex pected judgme nt. den oted £ f1(5)l. takin g
the ex pectation with res pect to different possibl e va lu es of D, is a nonincreas ing fu nction of 5.
Th us, B is no vv a fun ction of the settlement amount S proposed in the
spec ial offer, beca use B is a function of £[1(5)]. Le t B(5) denote thi s fun cti on, ancllct 5''' denote the optimal specia l offer for the o fferor. We ca n no w
show the following lemma:
LE iVIi'v i A J.
lf one party makes a special offer of sett lement, th en it can
maxim ize its own payoff by choosing the S th at equal s the payoff to the
plaintiff fr om the ord in ary bargaining gam e th at the parties wo uld play if
the offeree we re to reject the speci al o tTer. Th at is.
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S* = B(S*) ,

(2)

which implies
S''

= E[J(S*)] + 1h(Cd

~

Cr)·

(3)

The offe ree would ~1cc e pt thi s special offer.
Proof By analogy to proposition I, we know th;H

(-+I
reje ct ' S. rhen the pdrties immcclidtely h<:i11 ( > !d ill~tl) b:uThe N~t:-;h l>~trg~llning solution, like that clcsc ribccl 11 1 p;·o pU:-,lti on l.
res ults from this t'rc!inary bargaining game. The same pn!n i" ~tpp li cs, where
the expected judgment EIJ(S)] substitutes as a gencrali~:~ttion of the expected damages D.
Equality (2) follows from the behavior of the parties as they seek to rnaximize their payoffs. For example, suppose the plaintiff makes the special
offer. Given (4), we know that B'(S) :::::: 0, because E[J(S)] is a nonincreasing function of S. The plaintiff knows that if it demands S. it will receive
S immediately if S :::::: B(S), because the defendant would accept such a special offer, but B(S) immediately if S > B(S), because the defendant would
reject such a special offer. That is, the plaintiff receives min[S, B(S)]. Given
that B'(S) :::::: 0, the plaintiff could maximize this payoff, min[S, B(S)], by
choosing S such that S = B(S). The plaintiff can improve the terms of a
settlement by increasing the demand S, but the plaintiff would choose to do
so only as long as the defendant would still agree to the demand. To raise
it any higher would not only entail rejection but also reduce the plaintiff's
payoff from such a rejection (because it increases the likelihood of unfavorable cost shifting). Thus, the plaintiff chooses the S that is so large as to be
barely acceptable to the defendant.
Sup pose instead that the defendant makes the special offer. By similar
reasoning, the defendant would have to pay max[S, B(S)] and could minimize the plaintiff's payoff by choosing S = B(S). Thus. (2) holds whether
the plaintiff or the defendant makes the special offeri 6 Finally , (3) follows
from (2) and (4). Q.E.D.
RE iV!ARK.
Figure I illustrates whyS = B(S) is the optimai offer for either party to makc. 17
[f the

g~lilling.

16
If B(S) is constant at the S that solves (2), then there may be a r~1n gc o t' S va lues that
yield the sa me payutls for the parties. The party making the special offer wo ul d be indifferent
between the sol uti on 10 (2) and any of these other possible spec ial ollc rs. Assume for simplicity that th e party would alw ays choose the solution to (2) .
" After dev e loping our lem ma. we learned ab out an imlcpem\cm effort by Farm er :mel
Pc:corino. supru note 5. who develop a model of one particular ofler- uf-set tlemem rule ( ~1
defendant-only rule like Rule 68) and foc us on its effects on the im:cnti\ ,,::; to se!tlc. f' arm er
and Pecurino use a simibr· figure to illu strate a res ult similar to o ur lemma. hut they sLrtc
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Expected
Settlement

B(S)

0
F tGL!RE

S*

s

1. - The expec ted sc nle ment as a fun ction of the special otler S

The function B(S) represe nts the plaintiff' s payoff if the offeree rejects
the special offer and the parties instead settle through ordinary bargaining.
B(S) is a nonincreasing function of S, because a larger S increases the
plaintiff's ex pec ted liti gation costs under an offer-of-settlement rul e. The
45 -clegree line represe nts S, which is the plaintiff 's payoff if th e offeree
accepts the s pec ia l offer S.
lf the plaintiff makes the spec ial offer S, the n the defendant wo ulcl
chooseS if S s B(S) and B(S) otherwise. Thus, the plaintiff's payoff as a
function of S would be min[S, B(S)], represented by the lower envel ope o f
S and B(S). The plaintiff vvould maximize thi s function, min[S, B(S')j, by
choos ing the S iclenti t1ed by the intersection S = B(S).
Si milarly , if th e defendant makes the special offer S. then the plaintiff
wo uld chooseS if S :::=::: B(S) and B(S) otherwise. Thus, the plaintiff 's payoff
as a function of S wo ul d be max[5, B(S)], represented by the uppe r
envelope o f S and B(S'). The defendant wo uld minimize thi s function .
max[S, B(S)]. by choosing the S identifi ed by the intersec tion S = B(S) .

this result in e~ form specific to their nwclcl or ~t particu lar offer-of-sett lemen t ruk. with unly
one spec i~tl otle r by the clcfcndallt and one ordinary offer by the plaintiff. Our lcmm~t is mur·c
general : it applies to eith er p~trty under a wide variety of offer-of-settleme nt rules ~lllcl :t!Jm,·,;
for more complex b~trgainin g games .

OFFER-OF-SETTLEMENT' RULES

IV.

501

ONE SPECIAL OFFER vVITH ONE-SIDED Cosr SHIFTING

We will now apply the general principle set forth in lemma l to derive
the settlements that emerge under particular uffer-of- se ttlement rules. Offerof-settlement rules may provide for cost shifting only in one direction, or
they may provide for two-siclecl cost shifting. In this section, we assume
that the offer-of-settl e ment rule would shift costs only in favor of the party
making the spc ci~1l oiler. Fm c.\amplc. suppuc;e the ck:k·ncLmt makes a special offer S. UmL.:r ~t! l ul.ler-ui - ~; culcm cnt ruk shittincc ccJsts unly in t"a\·o1·
uf the cldendam. the pLtllltitl wuulc! be obliged to p;1y C,, to the clefenclant
if the damages D arc less than or equal to S.
A.

Deji:ndwzr A-Jukes rhe Special Offer

First, we will consider a one-sided cost-shifting rule that allows the defendant to make one special offer. We will show that whether the rule requires such an offer or, like Rule 68, merely permits one, the outcome will
be the same. Subsequently we also address the case in which the plaintiff
may make the only special offer.
PROPOSITION 2. If an offer-of-settlement rule with one-sided cost shifting permits the defendant to make a special offer, then:
(a) The defendant will always choose to exercise this option, and the
plaintiff will accept the special offer.
(b) The settlement amountS* will solve
(5)
(c) The settlement amount will be (i) no greater than the expected settlement amount without the offer-of-settlement rule and (ii) strictly less than
the expected damages D.
Proof Let us first prove proposition 2(/J). Suppose the defendant
chooses to make a special offerS. In this case, the defendant pays the plaintiff D - C 1 if D -c=: S, but pays D otherwise. Because the court subtracts C1
from its judgment if and only if D -c=: S, the expected value of the judgment
equals

E[J(S)] = D -

C 1 pr(D

-c=: S).

(6)

Note that E[J(S)l is nonincreasing inS (and strictly decreasing inS as long
as pr(D = S) > 0). Given (6). lemma l implies that the optimal special
settlement offer for the defendant, S*, solves equation (5).
Note that (5) implies

(7)
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and together w ith propos iti on i, in eq ualit y (7) im p li es propos ition 2(c)(i).
Moreove r, as long as pr[D :::::: l5 + 1h(Cct - Cp) ] > 0, then S''' = D +
1 h( Cc~- C ,) will be in co ns iste nt with (5) and th e in eq u ality in (7) must hold
1
strictly. Thus, the defe nd a nt w ill a lways be willing to make a special offe r,
which the plaintiff will accept immeck1tcly. a nd the c!cfemLmt will th ereby
pay no more than it wo ul d in the ah~:cnc e of th e otlcr-of- scttleme nt rule:. In
~ene r:.tl , the defendant w i 11 bend! t :·;·, >:11 i !1 voki ng s uch ~~ ru lc. Thus. propo:-.i l ~ t~i-; ~(u) fo i l o\vs~ bec~tu s~~ t!:c cL~ f,_:i-id;_i;1t \\.\.tt_:ld nLtk·-.: ~t \f)Ccia l () t lt~r ~~~~
l u i\~ ~i ~; thi:-; offe r \vo uiJ yi~ld its rn:.L"~ ; ; -; 1 uin pu>:sibtc p~tyuff.
F inall y, to pro ve proposition 2(c)( ii ). :; up po::c S = JJ . C i \·en th~;t pr (D :::::
i5) = 1h, it would follow that (-~ ) ~til d (G) \vu u! cl impl y that B (S) =
75 - 1/cCP. In this case, B(S) < S, :Jncl (2) impli es that th e dcfcnclant w uulcl
p rcJc r to reduce S in order to minimi zc__its liabili ty . Thus, the defendant
wi ll alw ays make a special offer S ' < D, which the p laintiff will accept
immediately. Q.E.D.
REMA RK.
One-s ided cost s hifting ca n ne ver hurt an offe ror w ho invokes
a n offer-of- se ttlement rule: the offeror might w in reimbursement but would
neve r have to reimburse th e offe ree . T hu s, giv e n the o pti o n of making a
spec ial offer under a one-s ided cost- shifting rule, the defendant would always choose to make such an o ffer. Therefore, when cost shifting is ones id ed, it makes no differe nce whether the rule requires or merely permits
th e defendant to make a special offer. Furthermore, because the defendant
ca nnot harm its bargaining pos ition by making a spec ial offer under such
an offe r-of-settlement rule , the settle m e nt it can obtain by invoking the rul e
w ill neve r be less fa vorable to the defendant th a n the expected settlement
in the abse nce of such a rul e .
By making a special offer unde r a one- sided cos t- shifting rule , the defenda nt ca n also obtain a settlement for less than D. the da mage s expected at
tri al. The defendant can do so because a spec ia l o ffe r of D under s uch a
rule wo uld give the defe nda nt a threa t point to its adva ntage : if S = D, th e n
eac h s id e would be equally li kely to bear C 1 under the cos t-shifting rul e,
but only the plaintiff could bear CP . G iven th e threat of an outcome wors e
than D fo r t!1_e p laintiff, th e plaintiff would be w illin g to acce pt a spec ia l
offe r below D.
EXAM PL E.
Consider our numerica l example again. In that example, D
i:-; uniforml y d istributed in the inte rval (60, 140), and therefore
pr(D :::::: X) = X/80 -

;;~

(8)

fo r 60 ::s X ::s 140. Using (8) and our speciflc va lues fo r D, Cc~. and CP to
:' ub st itute in (5) and so lvin g fo r § '' y ields S'' = 76. T hu s, S* is not o nly
tess than the expected d a m ages , D = ! 00. but a lso less tha n the settlement
under ord inary bargaining in th e absence
a spec ial offe r, B(D) = SO.

or
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B.

Plaintiff Mak es rlzc Spcciu! Ofler

Suppose now that th e p la inti ff ma kes the ~;p cc i cil offer to se ttl e for an
amuunt S. Consider an offe r-of-sett lement rule :,; hift ing costs on ly in favor
of the pl:1intiff. Specin call y, suppose the dcfencl:.lnt wou ld be ob li ged to pay
Cl' i f the damz1ges D are greate r than S. The :;amc in tu iti on ~:er furth above
;_!ppliss by cma logy to thi s ca:,;c. By th e :;ame ;·c ;:;uning used to pmve propo:-: i r i~,) n ~~. \Y~.~ c aii

F' Rt ~ Pi > ;)! Tin N

(u)

sho\v the foll o\v ing :

3_

:_u1 cffe r- of- se ~t! en;en:. r1_ ; l:_~ \\'i lh o n t~ - ~ id ~d (0S t

If

sh lft -

T he plaintiff will always choose tn c:\t'rci'e th is opt ion. and the de -

fe ndant will accept the spec ial offe r.
( b)

Th:: :-;e:tkment amount 5* will suivc:

(9)
(c:) The se ttle ment amount will be (i) at least the expec ted settlement

amou nt without the__?tler-of-settlement rule and (i i) st ri ct ly greater th an the
expec ted damages D.
V.

ONE SPECIAL OFFER W ITH T wo -SID ED COST S HI FT ING

With tw o-s ided cost shifting, it is no longer unambi guously in a party's
interes t to make a special offer to settle, becau se such an offer will entail
the risk that costs will shi ft aga inst that party. Co nsider r! rst a scheme in
which such an offer is mand atory for the part y in qu est ion. We will subsequ e ntly co nsider a scheme in whi ch the party chooses whether to make such
an offe r.
A.

MandotorY Offers

Suppose that either the defendan t or the plain tiff mu st make a special
offer. App lying lemma l , we can show the follovvin g.
P ROPO SITIO N 4 . If an offe r-of-settlemen t rule with two-s ided cost shifting r·~q u i res e ither party to make a spec ial oiler. then the se ttlement amoun t
wil l be S''' = D .
Proo( Given a special offer for an amou nt S.

:s S) + C~'p r (D > S)
= D + CP - C pr \D :s S).

E" [J(S)l

D ·-

Cc~ pr (D

( I 0)

tl lt- jJ- Jc:lln
• t:t"l'
J' it'
' ;' U~ > -.>\' , cl tlC..l jJd
-., .,,
f'
1
lC v et\c,, l...·
p - ~ ~_,[ 1 ,: U 11<i )• ; 11
)S 'v
d 1"t" clllCt1
unly if D :s S. Note th at again E[J(S)] is nonin crettsing 111 S (a nd strictly
dccrea>;i ng in S ~ts long as pr( D == S) > 0) .
~

''" '
;">
OlC.dc
i,)l::

>

'

r':

;O>C"

'0"(1

.. ,

C•

<
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Us ing ( 10) and lemm a l , we find the optimal special offerS' for either
party mu st solve th e eq uati on

S = D + 1h (Cu - Cp) + Cr - C pr(D

s; S'') .

(I I)

whi ch implies
(' ·0·
.) ·.·

D + C [ 1h - pr(D s S ')! .

( 12)

1h.

Given th::ll pr (D S i))
we fincl S':' = f) is the llili<.[ ll': :-;cdution l·or
cq u~tti utl i. I ~L Til,:rL'\,>rc..·. the c• ptim~li :-; pec i~t! ufi'c1· :·,Jr ,:ii \:.: I' ill\ w ill :tl "\',·"(_t\·,·
,./ ,) c'ljlt'tl
'-

In
J .

Q [:
.

f',

. !_._.1.

RL\L\ IU..:.
Tu -;ec the int uitiun fm this res ul t, cun sidc..:r ~llli iH IIIIcric~d cxamrk. Suppuse the de kndant mu st nwke a s p eci~tl ofkr. !1. :.h e dckmbnt
offer s 100 ami th e plaintiff rej ec ts thi s offer, th en the parti e~ wi ll be equ<:~lly
likely to bear any liti gat ion costs. Once the sc heme incor-por<t tes two- sid ed
cos t shift ing, it no longe r matters which party wo uld have larger liti gatio n
costs. In stead. expectat ions rega rding the fin al all ocati on of the total liti gation costs C, which wo uld turn upon the trial outcome , wiII determine the
terms of settlement under any subsequent ordinary bargaining. If either
party makes a speci al offer of 100, then each side would be eq ually likely
to bear these litigation costs, and therefore the expected judgme nt is sim ply
100. Thus, the parties will settle for 100 whether the offeree accepts or rejects the special offer.
Can the defendant gain by making a special offer that does not equal
l 00? The defendant cannot gain by making any offer greater than l 00, because the plaintiff wo uld accept such an offer, 1x and as a result the defendant wo ul d have to pay more th an 100. If the defendant made a special
offer of less than I 00, then the plaintiff would reject. The defendant would
then be more likely than the plaintiff to bear any litigati on costs, the ex pected judgme nt wo ul d be greater than 100, and the threat po int wo uld favo r th e plaintiff in the ord inary barga ining that wo uld follow. T hu s, the defendant wo uld expect to pay more than 100 in the settl eme nt that wo uld
follow rejec tion of a spec ial offer of less than I 00 .
Fin all y, if the plaintiff rather th an the defendant makes the special offe r,
th e sa me logic appli es. lf th e plaintiff makes a special o ile r of l 00, then
the plaintiff will obta in 100 in a settlement. If the plaintiff we re to make
any other special offe r. then the plaintiff wo uld receive less than 100 in a
settl ement. 1"

'' Rejc:c tion by the plai ntiff wu ulcl onl y make the plainti ff lllC>rc likel y

th ~ 1n

the clc fen dant

to bear any litigatiun costs. so that the expected set tl ement in anv su h>cqu c nt ordinary bar-

gaining wou ld be less than I 00.
In thi .s sense . t\\ O-sidcd cost shiftin g resto res symmetry tn the bargaining power of th e
1•an ics in scttklnclll negut iations. The spec ial offer of settle ment c limi n~rtcs ~IllY dlcct that
~~ dillcrct ll'e in li tigation C<lsts. C1 - CP, wou ld have on th e scrtkmcnt :1rnou nt.
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Oprionol Offers

If the use of the offer-of-settlement rule is optional, then a party's deci sion on whether to invoke the rule will depend on whether a ::;pcc ial oiler
would impro ve the term s o f settleme nt fot· the offeror. If th e effec t on these
term s fa,·ors the defe nd ant , rhen th e cl efe nclant wi ll gai n from inv oki ng an
offe t·-o t--.: en lement rul e, but the plaintiff will not. ff this effec t r·a\lw; th e
pl:titltif: in ste dd. then th e pl:t intitl wil l prekt t\l usc such ~~ ruL:. hut th e
de kndctnl wi ll prefer !ltlt w d\) so . 'lhu s:
PR O I' tJS ITI O~ 5. If an offe r-of- sett le ment rule \\' ith t\vo-sidcd cost shifting perm its but does not require th e part y in qu est io n to ma!-:e a special
offe r. then the party will make suc h an o tTer if and on ly if its li tigation costs
arc htgher. Spec iticall y:
(o) The defendant wou ld choose to make a special oiler if and on ly if

cd > cr.
(b)

The plaintiff wo uld choose to make a special offer if and only if

Cp > Ct.
If the party that has th e option elects to make a special offer, then th e
settlement will be S* = D.
Proof We know from proposition 4 that by making a special offer under a two-sided cost-shifting rule, either party can obtai n a settlement for
D. Given the option of making such an offer, a party would choose to do
so if and only if Dis better for the offeror than the settlement it could obtain
in th e absence of a special offer, which we know fro m proposition I wo uld
yield the amount D + 1h(Cct - Cp)· Thu s, a special offer would eliminate
the disad vantage that a party suffers as a result of hi gher liti gation costs,
and each party finds that a special offer improves its payoff if and only if
it has hi gher li tigation costs than th e other party. Q.E.D.
REMARK.
If we wanted to ensure that the part ies settled for an amo unt
equa l to the expected damages , we cou ld do so using either one of two
offe r-of- settlement rul es: (i) we could require either one of the ra rties to
make a specia l offer th at wo uld tri gger two-sided cost shifting, or (ii) we
could g ive the party with higher litigation costs the option of making such
an o ffer. We co uld imple ment the second rule only if we know how CP a nd
CJ co mpare. The tlrst rule cloes not require such knowledge.
Vl.

SPEC IAL OFFERS BY

BOTH

PLAINTIFF AND DEFE NDANT

In thi s secti on, we all ow up to two special offers, SP and SJ, by the pla in tiff and by the defendant , respecti ve ly. Spec itl call y, first one pclrty may or
must make a spec ial offer. If the tlrst party does not make a special o ffer ,
or if the second party rejects the spec ial offer , th en the second party ma y
or mu st make a spec ial offer. Ass um e that th e second party cu1 reject the
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fi rst spec ial offer and mak e a seco nd spec ia l offer immeciiGtely. If neither
party accepts a special offer. then the part ies immediately enter th e firs t
round of ordinary barg <!ining.
Given one or both of these s peci a l offers, the offer- of-sett le m e nt rule
then provides for possible cos t s hifting if the parties litigate to judg me nt. 1f
D > Sr . th e n th e deren cl:.tnt re imburses the plaintiff fo r its liti gat ion cos ts .
If D ::::; S c~ . the n the plctinti li" t eimb ur s c~ the dekncbn t fo r its li tig :. rtion costs.
rr sd < f) :::; Sp, th ~~ n ;.-: ~ .- ~- ~ ·:j:_; i t1: i l·l: p~·ly :-: th e d cf--: n d ~ il 1t~ S ens:.~: if ;. ~n d u ni y it'
th e plai ntii"Cs special uif.:r· Lli~ g ,c ; :; t1:. u-si c.k:d cos t ::;hi ftin g , 't nd the defendan t pays th e plainti ii ·:-; cu:; ls i i an d u nl y if the Jefenc!ant's ::; pecia l offe r
trigg ers two-s ided cos t shi lt ing .
W e will refe r to all o !"fe r·-of-settl e me nt rules fittin g the descript io n set
for th above as "two-p~trty" rul es . Let S 1 de note the first specia l offer, and
if the second party rejects tha t offer and makes a seco nd s peci a l offe r, le t
S 2 den o te th e second s pecial offer. Th at is, Jet Si represent the spec ial offer
by party i, whether party i is th e plaintiff or the defendant, and le t Sf" deno te
the optimal spec ial offer for party i.
The structure we hav e described inc lud es many poss ibl e two-party rul es,
which vary with respec t to whether
(l) the plaintiff or the defendant is the first party to m ove,
(2) the rule req uires or merely permits the first party to m ake a s peci al
offer,
(3) the first special offer tri ggers o ne- sided o r tw o-s ided cos t shifting,
(4) the rule req uire s or merely permits the second party to make a special
offer, and
(5) the second spec ial offer triggers one-sided or two-sided cost shifting.
Thus, there are 32 possible two-party rules depending on the fiv e binary
choices listed above. As it turn s o ut , however, none of th ese choices affec t
the outcome . All the se two-party rul es prove to be equiv a le nt a nd lead to a
settlem e nt for the amount !5 :
PROPOSIT ION 6 . U~cl er any two-party offer-of-se ttlem ent rule, the se ttlement will be S;" = D.
Proof We ca n prove this propos ition using m et hod s similar to those
used in prov ing the pre ceding propos itions. Because the proof is quite lon g,
we hav e omitted it here. but it appears in the working paper ve rs ion s of thi s
article. 20

"' See Lucian A. Bebch uk & f-h>lva rd F. Chang. The Effec t of Offcr-c)l-S ettlement Rul es
on the Terms of Sett lement (Wurki ng Paper i\ o. 6:509. National Bureau of Eco nom ic Re, e ~\rch 1993) ; Lucian .<\. 13 chclwk & 1-!uwat·d F. Chang, The Effec t of Offer-o f- Settlemen t
Rules on the Term s of Set tle ment t D i~c u s si o n Paper No . 228. Harvard L:tw Sch oo l. John i'v!.
Olin Cente r for Law . Ec uno tnic" s. :md Business 1997 ).
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The basic int uiti on for this result is as follow s. Once a party
can invoke the offer-of-settleme nt rule. it can do at least as well as it can
under a se ttlement for the amo un t D . H both sides ca n in voke the rule. then
the outco me must be a settleme nt fo r th e amoun t iJ.
REMARK.

V II.

SKEWED DISTRIBUTI ONS .\ ND D IS!'l;TJ'S

(1\ "JI{

LL\131L!TY

Th e pr~· ":~d ing ~m~t! v;;; i s ha;;; assumL·d t h ~ tt (l i' di.,t :i bt~tc d ab uut its m~an
~uc h th ~lf p r ( /) ~::::

/~ . Th~it is. D -::; D cll!d f) ·: /) ~trL' equ~dly likely
eve nt s. The
dist
ri
bution
of D may instead be s kC\\ eel , huwcvcr,- so that
pr(D :::::; 0 ) :;!: 1/:. Suppose we rel:lx our assumption th~tt jX(D :::::; D) = 1h.
Lemma l, wh ich die! not turn on thi s assumption. would still hold. \Ve
wou ld, however, need to reco nsider the specilic conc lu sions that we derived
from the app li cation of th at lemma to particular oiler-of-se ttlement rules.
Unde r one-party offer-of-settlement rul es with one-sided cost shifting, it
remain s true that a party with an option to make a spec ial offer wo uld always choose to make such an offer. Furthermore , the offeror wo uld still
never be better off under a regime in which it co uld not make a special
offer. It wo uld no longer be true, however, that a special offer would always
yield an ou tcome better than D fo r the offeror. c1
Unde r one- party offer-of-settleme nt rules with two- sided cost shifting,
the optimal special offer would no longer necessarily eq ual D. Suppose the
appli cable rul e makes a spec ial offer mandatory. Then we ca n show the follow ing.
PROPOSITION 7. If a one-party offe r-of-se ttl ement rule with two-sided
cost shifting req uires a party to make a spec ial offer, then:
(a) If pr(D :::::; D ) > 1h, then the se ttlement amount wi ll be 5''' < D.
(b) If pr(D :::::; D) < 1h, then the settlement amount will be 5''' > D.
Pmof If pr(D :::::; D ) -:f. 1h, then the proof for propo sition 4 is still valid
up to and including equation (12), but now S' = 75 does not solve ( 12).
Sup pose the offeror makes a spec ial offerS = D. If pr(D :::::; D) > 1h, then
B(S) eva lu ated at S = 75 is strictly less than D. Therefore, lemma 1 implie s
that the opt im al special offerS''' fo r either party un der two- sided cos t shifting, given by the solution to ( 12), also must be strict ly less than D. By the
sa me reaso ning . if pr(D :::::; D) < 1h, then B(D ) > D. and lemm a I implies

f)) =

1

21
rr pr(D :S IJ) 2: 1/ 2. then an o llc:T-Of-seul ement rule t;J\'ming the defendant wuu ld stil l
ensure a settlement less than 75. If pr(D :S_75) > '/'. hmvcvcr. a rule favo rin g the plaintiff
would not eno;un:: a settlemen t greater than D. The S'• in ('-!) cnulcl be less than 75. ff pr(D :S
75) :S 1h. ti Kn a 1·ulc favorin g the plaintiff would en smc a settlement greater than 75. If
pr(D :S 75) < 1/2. however. th en a rule favor ing the: dekmlarH wuuld not ens mc a settlement
les> than 75. The S in (5) cou ld be greatc:r than i5
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that the offeror wou ld prefer to offer some S':' > D, which wou ld sati sfy
( 12) . Q .E.D.

Case s in which th e defendant contes ts liability prese nt a particularly im port:lnt category of skewed dis tributi ons. The distri but ion of po~s ib lc pay o ffs for th •..: plaintiffs in such cases ge nerall y fea tme a dis cre tt: probability
!11<\ SS at [) = 0. \Vi th some tec hni ca l modifi cati ons . we Cclll c~\tenc! our
nll lck i to in cluck payoff d i ~;trib utions with such cb crctc pruhct b il it ' mct:·:';r:s .
lf :.! dc'fcndanr th~tt p rr_:\-~tiL~ ~.~n l i~t biiity ,_-~tn in vc~ k t: ;,_· ~ J st ~~hit-~ 1:1 ~: :. :nc! c c an
uf !'cr -- uf- :;(tllc~nl cnt rule . th en thi:) pt)ssi bility \\·uuld ~ k(:\\. tl·ic. di >~tri() u t iu:1
;ck\:llll l or cal culating the c.\[JC:C tcd cuc; t ~hi!'ting elL tr i,:l. The pu:-,:. ibi li ty
d L:t the ck fen d<lnt could pi·c va il o n liability mil y imply a r:1<2d !'1:1 str ict Iy
be lO\V th e mean .'c If so, th e~~ in these cases pr(D::; D) > h. It is ,t\so poss ibl e. howeve r. that pr(D ::; D) < h when li ab ility is in dispute.
To take a simple exampl e, consider a case in whi ch the parti es agree on
da mages and dispute onl y li ability. Let L denote the damages th at the defe ndan t would pay the plaintiff if the court were to find liability . Let p de note
the probability that the plaintiff prevail s on liability, wi th 0 < p < l. Thus,
th e distribution features a di screte probability mass of p at D = L and a
di screte probability mass of 1 - p at D = 0. In this example, D = pL, and
pr(D s: D) = I - p. In thi s case, proposition 7 implies the fo llowing:
CO ROLL ARY.
If a one-party offer-of-settlement rule with two- sided cost
shifting requires a party to make a special offer, and the parties dispute on ly
li ab ility, th en:
(a) If p < h, then the settlement amount will be S''' < D.
(b) If p > h. then the settlement amount will be S* > 75.
Fi nall y, by the same re ason ing used to prove proposition 6, we can also
show that the sa me outcomes would emerge under a two- party offer- ofsettlement rul e. In particular, if both parties can make a special offe r, se ttlement will always occ ur at the same 5*, because each party cou ld ensure an
outco me at least th at favorable for itse lf by making a special offe r. ' 3 T herefore, both propositi on 7 an d its corollary would apply under any tw o-party
rule.
1

1

1
1

VII I.
A.

Tiv!l'LiCATlONS OF TH E ANALYSIS

l111plicotions for Ourcomes under the Existing Rule 68

Our analy sis enabl es us to ide nti fy the outcome und er any given offer-o fsett lement rule. To illustrate, let us now apply this an alys is to th e outcomes
= ~ Thomas .J. Cc:mpbc: ll. Fcdcr~il Rul e of Civil Procedure 6S : /\ Com nH::n t (\Vo rkin g Paper
Nu. 3 1. Stan!'ut·d La w Sc hool. J,.Jhn !VI. Olin Pro>: ram in Law and Eco nomics 1937) , ar>!uc cl
l.h~u ~~' a rc,;u lt. eve n unde r a two-p:u·tv o fkr-of- s~ttlem e nr rule. th e uutc un 1c Wl'uld be b i~t, ed
in !'avo r of th e clcfenda m.
~ ' Spccilic<illy. th e se nkment -,vi ii occur at the S''' th at soJ,·e s eq uariun ( 12).
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ex pected unckr the ex isting R ule 68. As noted , under Rule 68 as it c urrentl y
sta nds. onl y rhe defenda nt has th e opti on of mak in g a special offer. and
such an o!T<2r c1n trig ge r onl y one-sided cost shi ft ing.
Assume !"or <1 moment that if th e plaintiff obtained less at trial than th e
spec ial offc!·. the defendant wo uld al·ways get full reimbursement for all litigation COS[:,;_ Linde r this <lS~) UiT1pti o n. th e settlement ~li110 Unt WO Ul d be the.')'''
thu t sUl\ ·c >: ·,.'t.j 1.l~lt i c) n (5) : s:::
~l' h~.:.·

=:

l)

+

1/ : . (Cd -

C:.l) -

!: ·-.~, )\-~.· : .:. :<:-~ l_ . n ·: ~~~~H )n . lJr:-,\\·\~,_,.~: r . dot~S not ilU \\

("'ti pr( f) ::S .)·:;: ·).

huld \Vilh

r t·.·~l~L·!_· t

tn t ht_'

CX1slitlg [~ Lilt.:: ~:;~: l·~ ji. ~ \\'U l"(~L :)U :l S . r: irsl, under lhC c ;\i;)ting f-<.uJc (}0~ LU St

shift iilg i:; ~'nly p~trLial. Reimbu rsement o[ exp,~n sc:s cuvc:rs oni y co un fee s
and n<.;t <ttt,J;·n·._::,.-;· i'cc:s. Let 0 deno te the fraction oC the clcfcndcult's costs
CJ that the plai11tiff wou id have to pay in the event of cost shift ing.
St:c ond. in De ft(! Air Lines v. August, 21 the Supre me Court held that a
defendant cannot in voke Rule 68 cost shifting if it prevails on liability.
T hus, the defendant will be reimbursed onl y if th e p laintiff prevails on li ability but wins less in da mages than the special offer S* . Suppose that if
the plainti ff prevails on liability, it always wins a positive amount. Thus,
the defend ant receives reimbursement if D :::::: S''', but on ly if D > 0 also.
With th ese two limitati ons on reimbursement for the defendant, the settlement amount S''' under the existing Rule 68 will solve

Equation ( 13) reveals why Rule 68 cunently has littl e practical significance
and why clcfenclants in many cases do not take ad vantage of the opportunity
to make spec ial offers. T he only difference that the ex isting Rul e 68 makes
is the introduc tion of th e cost-shifting term, 8CJpr(O < D :::::: S*) , in th e
eq uation for the equ il ibrium settlem ent amount. If 8 is small , as it is likely
to be und er the ex istin g ruie, thi s te rm will be small even if the optimal
special offe r implies th at pr(O < D :::::: S"') is positi ve.
Moreover. give n that the clefencbnt receives no reimbursement if it wi ns
on liabiiity, eve n the be st special offer Y may im ply that the probability of
re imbursement eq ual s zero . To illu strate. consider the example we ha ve
used above. with D = 100, CP = 60, Cc~ = 20, and 8 = l, but suppose that
the dispute is over on ly liability rath er than da mages. In parti cul ar, suppose
that the plaintiff will win either 200 or 0, and eac h outcome is cquail y
likely . In thi s case, the so luti on to (!3) \vo ulcl be S* = 80, whi ch implies
that th<~ probability of reimbursement is zero : pr(O < D :::::: S*) = 0. ln fa ct,
any special utf.: r belo w 200 in thi s example would fail to trigger J ny .Ruie
68 cost shifting. Thus , under Rule 68 as it currentl y stands, th e ex pected
se ttlem:n l in thi:; case \v ouid be the same with a special offer clS 'vv ithout
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any special o ffer, and the clcfe nclan t wo uld have nothing to ga in by in vo king th e rul e.
Note that our ana lys is ~1 l so en,tbl es ident ifyin g the settle ment term s that
wou ld res ul t from anv ur th e vari ous ame ndments of Rule 68 that ha ve bee n
propose d. Amendments h'tve been proposed to (i) allow eith er party to
make a spec ial o ffer of :;e tr lc :nent und e r Rul e 68. (ii ) inclu de atwrne ys ' fees
in the co5ts th <tt may he :;hii tc: d to the party reject ing the offer. '111 d (iii ) all ow
a ckf:.. : ncl an t that ''ilh till li. :i)i!ity ltl ill\ nl\.c rh e 1·u lc .ci .'~S i:; :;u~g·.::;t,_:d h;.
the preceding :malys is, i f th e:< :tm •..: ncliil<.' nh h:t d been ad optee!. they \\'OL il d
have co nsiderab ly i ncrc~l sc d the usc of !\ ulc 68 o ffers. Funh c rlll ore , b;
using our lem ma I ;mel our r~ n lp(.l:~ iti on s , it is pos sibl e to ide ntify th e effect
th at each of these amendme nt s would have on th e terms of settl e me nt.
B.

lnzplicution s for th e Design of O.ffer-oFSeu lement Rules

Our analys is has norma tive impli cations. The main effec t of th e law on
outcomes is through its in fl uence on settl eme nt term s. Therefore, in design ing an offer-of- settleme nt rul e we should take into account the rule ' s potential effect on the term s of sett lement. The model developed in thi s paper
enab les us to identify thi s e ffect.
On e interestin g implicati on of the an alysis is the possibility of designin g
ru les to elimin ate or redu ce th e eli vergence between settlement term s and
the expected judgment. While settlement terms are always chosen in anti cipation of th e expected judgment at trial, they might well diverge from it
rather than mimic it. To be sure , th e lega l sys tem, recognizing th at settlement outc omes might di ve rge from the ex pected judgment, might set th e
ex pected judgment not at th e leve l of the des ired outcome but rather at th e
level that wo ul d result in se ttlement term s close to the desired outcome.c6
There are still many co ntexts , however, in whi ch it is reasonable to ass um e
that th e legal system has se t expected judgments at the level that is equ al
to the desired outcomes . In such cases, it wo ul d be des irable to ha ve settlement terms mimic th e expectt:d outco me of th e tri al- th at is , to eliminate
the di vergence betwee n th ese term s and the expected judg ment.
As we hav e seen, one important possible source o f diverg e nce (t hou gh,
as di sc ussed below . not th e onl y source) is asy mmetric liti gati on costs. In
the absence of an offer-of- se tt leme nt rule , settlement terms (com pared with
the expected judgment) te nd to favo r th e party wi th lower liti gation costs.

~; See Pre liminary Drai't nf l)i.Op<bcd Ame nd ments to the f ede ral Ru les of Ci vi l Proce dure. 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-li3 ( llJSJ~: 10::> F.R.D. -125. 4 32-33. 437 ( 1984) .
~ ~. Sec Bebchuk . supm note 7. O ne 11-~ty in which !he lega l syste m might atte mp t to do :-o
is by using tre ble dam~l!'CS <lr pun iti ,·c da mages.
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Fee-shifting rul es, we have see n. ca n be designed to address thi s effect of
asy mme tri c litigation costs. Under the co nditi ons th at we ha ve identified, it
is possible to design rul es that would move settlem e nt s toward the expected
damage s. Furthermore, the design of these rule s does not require public officials to ha ve inform ati o n that wou ld be c!it'ti cu lt to obtain ex ante (for exam pl e, w hi ch party is ex pected to have IO\\'er l i r ig~1r i o n cos ts) .
i\s we h~1ve sho\\'n . one \vay to get settkll 1<..'11l.~ eq ual to the expec ted
.iudgrnem i .~ lll ;·equirc l)!LC Of the panic·;; il' i li :tk ~ · :: ·; [>Cc_'J:ti Ci ller w ith t\\ 0s iclecJ cost shifting. As l ong ~~:-; the cust shifting iliciuc:es ~dl litig~1tiun custs
and is two -si ded. thi s r ul e \vou ld prucluce a1 1 expected sellleme nt equal to
th e expected judg ment , w he th e r the rule rc~quire:-, the pb imi ff or the defe ndant to make the offe r. An alternati ve that yields the sa me outcome is to
give each party an option to make a special offer '' Note that Rule 68 as it
stands currently is quite different from any of the rules that, und e r the identified circumstances, would ensure se ttlements that mimic th e expected
judgment. Under the existing Rul e 68, (i) only the defendant may make a
special offer, yet this offer is optional, (ii) th e cost shifting is one-sided,
and (iii) the cost shifting is only partial and doe s not include attorneys' fee s.
While the potential use of offer-of-settlement rules to move settlement
terms closer to the expected judgment is an in tere st ing poss ibility , we are
at this stage far from being in a position to make any recommendations concerning such use of these rules. First, we have shown how to ensure settlement terms equal to the expected judgment onl y in the situation in which
the judgme nt is equally likely to be hig her or lowe r than its expected value.
Disputes over damages alone may come close to thi s situation , but cases
that include a dispute over liability are unlikely to clo so. To produce settlements equal to expected trial outcomes in cases of di sputed liability, offerof-settlemen t rules would have to be more complex: we leave this subject
to future research.
n Other mechanisms can :dso produce th e same outcome. Ande rson. supm note 5. proposes two procedu res, the "since rity rule'' and a "ti na! ufkr aucliu n, .. which wou ld generate offers that mimic the expec ted aw:nd at trial. but to ac hi e1·e this ou tcome . each procedure
must inc lu de a prohibition on subsequent bargai ning. T he offer-o f- settle ment rules we desc ribe wou ld achieve this outcome wit hout any pro hibiti o n un subseq uent bargaining. One
particularly simp le procedure cou ld also e li minate the bargaining advantages derived from
asy mmetri c liti ga tion costs: at the end of a tri~il. the court coul d divide the total litigation
costs evenly between the plaintiff an d the defendant. Thi s cos1 -s hifting ru le, however, would
require the part y that spends less on litigatio n to bea r some of !he costs of the party th at
spends more. eve n if the party with higher ex pendiw res loses ~tt tria l. Because thi s type of
cost shift ing wo ul d strike many as unfair, it see ms unlik e ly to be adopted. The offer-ofsettle ment nile s we ckscribe see m more appealing from a fairness perspective, because they
shift the burden of litigati on cos ts tOW<lrd the party that was apparently tou intransigent in
se ttlement barga in ing . Furthermore. as cli:;cus:-ed belmv. offer-ol-sc! tlcrnent niles may have
other cksi1"<1llle pmpe rties. such as inncasing the probability ul seitl emenl.
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Seco nd. the effect that an offe r-of-se ttl e ment rule has o n settle me nt term s
is not the o nl y e ffect of th e rul e that s hould be take n into acco unt in evaluat ing its merits. It would be importa nt to cons ide r also th e ru le ' s effect o n
the li ke lih ood o f settlemen t. 28 To focus on settlement te rms. we ass um ed
sy m me tric inform ati o n. which ensured that all cases will settle (w ith the
o nl y q ues ti o n be in g fo r how mu c h ) 2 ~ It s hould be no ted. h U\V r2 \ ·~r. that using a model with as ym metr ic informati on . i( ~l i h ryn Sp ier h~t:; ck' :rwn:;trat l:cl
!h:.t t i!"! th t' Ca::C ill \V hi ch th~.:- j~arries di spur~: ~.)n ly c1 ~t i11ag~:..~S ~l.i l.J ~i;;_· _j ud gn1c nt
i:~~ cqu ~dly

likel y to

e xcc~d

or to fa ll bcl u\\' it s

rncan~ ~t l_·,,_-rt ~ t ii1 L\\ ' U--p~.~ ri. y

otT:: r- of-sert lcnh.:nt rule \v ith L\\O-sided cos t shiftin g v,·iJl aLlu~dly :n~t.\ imi z e
the likel ih oo d
se ttl e m e nt.'(!
Furthermore, an as sess ment of a n offer-of-se ttl e ment m k s ho uld take
into acco unt also th e rule' s e ffec t on th e level of liti gation c osts in th e event
of trial. In our model, we took thi s leve l to be gi ve n exo geno usly . A s is
true fo r any fee-shifting rule, however. an offer-of- settlement rul e would
increase the liti gation costs in a trial, because in the eve nt of trial, eac h
party wou ld know that , with some probability , it would not have to bear
fully its litigati on costs .
· Finally, even foc using only on the terms of settlem ent , it should be noted
that o ur model has focused on only one reason - namely, asymmetric litigation costs- for se ttlement term s to dev iate from th e expected judgment. In
particular, we have assumed that all litigants are ri sk neutral, cannot credibly commit to a strategy that insists on a di sproportionate s hare of th e gains
from settlement , and have an equal ability to make settle ment offe rs. Relaxing these ass umpti o ns would introduce other sources for di verge nce between the terms of se ttlement and the expected judgment-such as differe nce s between the pa rties in their ab ility to bear ri sk or to co mmit to a
certain bargaining position. The presenc e of these ot her so urce s of diverge nce s ugges ts that much analysis must be done befo re we k no w which
rul es and institutions would bes t align se ttlem e nt o utcomes \Vi th the ex -

or

~' Indeed. a comprehen sive normative anal ysis of an offer-of-se ttl ement ru le wo uld inclu de an ev aluation of the effe cts not only on the parties· iiKcntives ttl sett le but :dso on the
plaintiff's ince nti ves to fi le suit and on the defendant' s ince nti ves to co mply with the law
(see Hylton. supro note 5).
"' Modeb of litigati on and settle ment incorporating :1symmt:tric inform:lti on show that suc h
asy mmetr ie s hinc!ei· settlement and create so me positi ve probab ilii y that sett le me nt negotiation s brea k clown and the parti es go to tri al. Sec. for exampk. Lucian A. 8cbchuk , Liti gation and Sett le ment unde r Imperfect Info rm ati on. 15 RAND j. Eco n. -W-1- ( 1964); Je nnifer F.
Re ing an um & Loui s L. Wilde, Se ttlement. Litigati on. :111 d the Al locati on of Li tiga tio n Costs.
i 7 RAN D J. Econ. 55 7 ( 1936).
''' See Spi er, supru note 5. She prese nt s ano ther model. however, that indicat es that an
o tl er-o f-settkme nt ru le can decre;lse the probabili ty or se nle ment if the liti ga nts disagree
~tbout li abil it y and the d:1magcs arc kn ow n.
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pec tccl judgm ent. W e hope that future wo rk w ill pursue thi s agenda for research.

IX.

CoNcL usiON

Thi s paper has anal yzed the effect of otltT- o f- sett lement rule s on th e
te rms of se ttl ement . 'vVe first se t for th a gener<tl 1·esult that enables us to
it:~·ntil'y the se ttlement amount un de1· ~tn y such ru le . \Vc· ha\ l ' then ~tp[ llicti
tl:t·· i'L'c-ult lO ck~l·ive th e outcome undl.'t Ll:c :: ·:usl in : pun~uH ut' tilL·.-;c:: ;u\c .'..
~huw1 11g Lhdt <t large set of see min gly di llcrent ru lc:s prod uce identical settlcil iCIHS Th e icienLifi ecl effects
th ese ru les on sert lemcn t term s have i mpi !C(lli ons, wh ich we ha ve discussed, fur <til)' JWSitive or norm<ttive evalua !llH1 r)f th e rules.

or

